The Syrian conflict has birthed hundreds of armed groups fighting for pockets of territory, often at a highly localised level. For daily humanitarian practices, this fragmentation and localisation has meant that aid must transit across multiple conflict lines and must be guaranteed through countless negotiations to reach people in need. In other words, a number of armed groups must be relied on at some point in the transit process. However, acknowledging links with warlords and gunmen is not easily admissible for many international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) that have tried to balance the humanitarian principle of neutrality with the practicalities of war-torn Syria. This is reflected in the words of a senior INGO staff member working in the southern governorate of Daraa for several years:<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0It is against our policy to engage with armed groups, but we do coordinate with them because our access has to be authorised by the security. However, we always refuse armed escorts for our convoys. Effectively, military groups are the first providers of access in Syria; they are also valuable sources of information and keep us \u2013 through our local partners \u2013 updated about potential risks for aid delivery, activities, or visits. For instance, they will tell us if there are clashes. Effectively, all our projects need to pass by security before we can implement them.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Indeed, the mission to connect and interact with armed groups, with all the hazards involved, falls on Syrian humanitarian staff that are implementing the activities of INGOs. At times, the task requires expert mediation and negotiation skills.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
A worker with a Syrian nongovernmental organization (NGO) \u2013 whom we will call Mohammad to protect his identity \u2013 reflected on negotiation practices for humanitarian aid during the last period of the siege of East Ghouta, which lasted between April 2013 and April 2018 and left some 400,000 people trapped in the eastern countryside of the Syrian capital, Damascus. According to Mohammad, in addition to the military offensive launched by the Syrian regime forces against anti-government forces, two main rebel factions were fighting over the control of the areas:<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Clashes <\/span>between these two groups<\/span> impacted<\/span> aid transit<\/span>. <\/span>W<\/span>e first had to cross a checkpoint controlled by Assad\u2019s army, then <\/span>several <\/span>checkpoint<\/span>s<\/span> controlled <\/span>by <\/span>Faylaq<\/span> al-<\/span>Rahman<\/span> or<\/span> Jaysh al-Islam. <\/span>As a result, w<\/span>e had to replicate our activities on each side. If we <\/span>wanted<\/span> to, <\/span>let us<\/span> imagine, transit food baskets to reach areas controlled by <\/span>Faylaq<\/span> al-Rahman through a checkpoint controlled by Jaysh al-Islam, the armed men of Jaysh al-Islam would require us to leave 100 food baskets for people living in their areas<\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Mohammed also record<\/span>ed<\/span> how armed groups monetised[i]<\/a> the movement of humanitarian aid in eastern Ghouta:<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Jaysh al-Islam made our work more challenging because <\/span>they<\/span> created taxes at two checkpoints<\/span>; it <\/span>originally <\/span>amounted to<\/span> 1% of the <\/span>goods\u2019 <\/span>value. <\/span>In 2017, when the conflict <\/span>escalated<\/span> in East Ghouta, the fee for aid transit increased from 200 to 2,300 Syrian liras per kilogramme of <\/span>goods<\/span>\u2026 <\/span>It was <\/span>essential<\/span> for us to pay taxes at checkpoints because it guaranteed the safety of our convoy. At least, this was the <\/span>rationale<\/span> of Jaysh al-Islam because<\/span>,<\/span> in fact, it was impossible to ensure our safety in the middle of the conflict as bombs were <\/span>constantly <\/span>falling from the sky. <\/span>Effectively<\/span>, t<\/span>hey <\/span>never really tried to protect us and the aid, b<\/span>ut they would ensure that the convoy <\/span>would<\/span> not <\/span>be <\/span>atta<\/span>ck<\/span>ed by their armed men or by smugglers<\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
In Syria, <\/span>o<\/span>pposition armed groups do not have <\/span>monopoly over the monetisation of humanitarian aid<\/span>. <\/span>The Syrian regime forces<\/span>, until today, <\/span>use<\/span> similar practices even <\/span>in areas where<\/span> peace has officially returned<\/span>,<\/span> like in the south of the <\/span>country[ii]<\/a>.<\/span><\/span> A<\/span>s described by<\/span> a humanitarian worker who used to implement relief projects in Syria from across the Lebanese border<\/span>:<\/span><\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
When we were implementing projects <\/span>in Zabadani<\/span> [<\/span>in the northeast of Damascus<\/span>]<\/span>, which is <\/span>very close<\/span> to the Lebanese border<\/span>,<\/span> w<\/span>e had to pay 500 Syrian liras to armed men of the Hezbollah to cross the border. The Lebanese army does not have any control <\/span>there<\/span>.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
The success of negotiations for the transit of humanitarian aid <\/span>across Syria<\/span> is<\/span> circumstantial and heavily relie<\/span>s<\/span> on the presence of local guarantors <\/span>who have <\/span>strong <\/span>links <\/span>with armed factions. <\/span>For instance, <\/span>Mohammad himself was not involved in negotiations:<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Negotiations with armed groups were made by our logistic and project officers <\/span>based in the areas we wanted to reach<\/span> in<\/span> Syria. Both had strong social networks and relation<\/span>s<\/span> with local committees that supported local <\/span>NGOs<\/span> like ours to negotiat<\/span>ing<\/span> the transfer of aid. For instance, in 2017, a local committee help<\/span>ed<\/span> us secure an agreement with <\/span>several <\/span>armed <\/span>factions<\/span> according to which we did not have to pay any money, including taxes, to pass through their checkpoints and areas of control. However, these <\/span>local <\/span>committee<\/span>s<\/span> d<\/span>o<\/span> not have <\/span>s<\/span>uch power in all <\/span>areas<\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
International Rigidity<\/h4>\n
In Syria, INGOs and NGOs are funded by international donors whose views on humanitarian negotiations with armed groups are rooted in a polarised and alienated perception of the Syrian environment. It raises the question: Are practices of humanitarian negotiation and transit in line with donors\u2019 policies? The simple answer is no. A striking example is the refusal of INGOs to allocate part of their budget to facilitate aid transit through checkpoints for any armed groups other than the Syrian army, leading to Syrian humanitarian workers paying taxes at checkpoints from their salaries: \u201cWe do not have the option not to pay taxes at checkpoints if we want the aid to reach populations.\u201d<\/p>\n
The author met several representatives of non-Syrian (I)NGOs to discuss their views and at-a-distance practices for bringing humanitarian aid into Syria; only a handful of representatives agreed to discuss the issue. One representative used to work for a faith-based British NGO funded by the Department for International Development (DFID)[iii]<\/a> which implemented projects in Syria. She acknowledged the gap between strict funders\u2019 policy and the complex reality of the Syrian context which required flexibility to secure aid delivery:<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
O<\/span>u<\/span>r<\/span> funders did not allow for certain practices such as <\/span>paying taxes at military checkpoints, which they consider <\/span>bribe<\/span>ry<\/span>. At some point, one roundtable was held between DFID and <\/span>a number of<\/span> INGOs<\/span> and Syrian NGOs based in the <\/span>United Kingdom (<\/span>UK<\/span>)<\/span>. We tried to make the case that DFI<\/span>D had <\/span>very <\/span>strict<\/span> policies in place and that these policies did not take into consideration the reality on the ground for Syrian <\/span>partners<\/span> \u2013 especially in terms of security. <\/span>For instance, we told them that <\/span>bribes<\/span> just <\/span>h<\/span>a<\/span>ve<\/span> to<\/span> be paid,<\/span> otherwise, w<\/span>e are <\/span>very l<\/span>imited<\/span> in what we can do. However, DFID refused to follow up on the roundtable. They used the excuse that the meeting was held under Chatham <\/span>H<\/span>ouse rules and <\/span>that, <\/span>as a conse<\/span>quence<\/span>, they could not discuss it<\/span> f<\/span>ur<\/span>ther.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
Another meeting happened with DFID in early 2014. They presented the budget for Syria, and already back then, they insisted that nobody should use illegal money transfers. We, humanitarian workers, understand the security issues for DFID, especially when it comes to getting aid into areas like Idlib that are controlled by armed groups listed as terrorist organisations. But we also feel that they emphasise too much on their own protection and that of expatriate staff rather than Syrian partners and people in need.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
The truth is that when humanitarian aid goes somewhere in Syria, for instance Idlib, it does not benefit armed groups directly. Instead, it ensures these armed groups do not fill a vacuum.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
This <\/span>account <\/span>highlights<\/span> two sets of <\/span>challenges<\/span>:<\/span> The f<\/span>irst<\/span> involves<\/span> transfer<\/span>ring<\/span> money in a country divided into four spheres of governance with their own regulations and infrastructures. For instance, transferring money to northwest <\/span>Syria<\/span> is simply impossible through usual channels due to the absence of <\/span>a <\/span>banking system. Money for humanitarian project<\/span>s<\/span> must transit through informal channels<\/span> hinder<\/span>ing<\/span> traceability and transparency. Second<\/span>ly<\/span>, <\/span>while the primary goals of humanitarian action <\/span>are<\/span> to <\/span>save lives<\/span> and <\/span>alleviate suffering<\/span>, it <\/span>can <\/span>also reinforce the political and social legitimacy of actors that directly contribute to the conflict<\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Whose legitimacy?<\/h4>\n
The governorate of Idlib, located in the northeast of Syria and mostly controlled by the Salafi armed group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)[iv]<\/a>, illustrates the dilemma faced by the humanitarian community in the country. The group controls the last UN border crossing between Syria and Turkey, Bab al-Salam. Despite its attempts to seemingly soften its stance by showing pragmatism over the governance of Idlib governorate \u2013 theoretically in the hands of the de-facto Salvation Government \u2013 the group is still listed a terrorist organisation by a number of Western states. The head of the Local Administration Councils Unit (LACU), a Syrian civil society organisation that promotes good governance and local administration, denounced the double standards of UN policies relating to the delivery of humanitarian aid in the northwest: \u201cThe UN has more coordination with HTS than the Interim Government[v]<\/a> and local councils.\u201d<\/p>\n
The relationship between the UN and HTS puts local humanitarian actors in northwest Syria at a disadvantage. The founder of Violet Organization, a Syrian charity and large aid provider in opposition-held areas, shared a story that illustrates how HTS became a crucial asset for an international presence on the ground:<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Once, a dispute arose, and HTS threatened Violet to take all our assets. We went to the [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] OCHA for support but they said they could only negotiate with HTS to some extent because they needed them to approve the border resolution [to facilitate the entry of UN aid from Turkey].<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
This story highlights the lack of accountability of the UN towards Syrian humanitarian partners, as well as the impossibility of the UN remaining politically neutral when securing aid delivery.<\/p>\n
Paradoxically, or so it seems, the importance and legitimacy of HTS as a privileged partner for the delivery of humanitarian aid in northwest Syria is reinforced by the armed group\u2019s primary enemy: the Syrian regime, headed by President Bashar al-Assad, and the regime\u2019s use of humanitarian aid as a negotiation chip to secure political gains.[vi]<\/a> Until July 2023, only one out of four UN border crossings between Syria and neighbouring countries was operating. Bab al-Salam, managed by HTS on the Syrian side, was thus the last \u2018lifeline\u2019 for four million Syrians stranded in the northwest of the country.[vii]<\/a> According to the head of LACU, this situation has arisen from the fragmentation of legitimacy in northwest Syria:<\/p>\n